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1. Introduction
Definitions vary according to context of use and target audience. They are to be 
made relevant for each context to fulfill their cognitive and linguistic goals. This involves 
adapting their logical structure, type of content, and form to each context of use. We 
examine from these perspectives the case of definitions in ontologies. 
An ontology is a formal, machine-tractable representation of the types of entities 
and relations found in a given domain. Ontologies are built out of ontology elements 
called ‘terms’ (sometimes also called ‘classes’1) and ‘relations’. Those elements are 
standardly associated with axioms and with linguistic and other information such as 
synonyms and unique alphanumeric identifiers for the terms, and associated notes or 
comments.2 Importantly, ontologies — ideally, at least — contain definitions of their 
terms. What results when these elements are combined is a specification of a domain-
specific vocabulary, comparable to a terminological dictionary but with additional formal 
structure able to serve computational reasoning.3  
Ontologies have many applications,4 including: tagging large and heterogeneous 
bodies of data as a means of making the data available for integration, search, query, and 
analysis; use in natural language processing for semantically enriching texts; use in 
automated reasoning over annotated texts; use in decision-support systems; indexing of 
images for visually enriching ontologies; and linking of data of all types with relevant 
literature.  
However, the more such applications are successful, the more we face the risks of 
knowledge silo formation driven by the accumulation of uncoordinated or inconsistent 
ontologies, undermining their success. To counteract these risks, ontologies must as far 
as possible be developed in a rigorous fashion in order that they will acquire the degree 
of trust from potential users that is needed to ensure that they will be used and re-used to 
the maximal possible degree. 
1 In some older traditions also called ‘concepts’ (Schulz, et al. 2013). 
2 See RDF Schema 1.1, http://www.w3.org/TR/rdf-schema/. See also Ceusters and Smith (2010), Rubin, et 
al. (2007), and Smith, et al. (2006). 
3 For examples, see the biomedical ontologies at Ontobee (http://www.ontobee.org). 
4 See for example, Bodenreider and Stevens (2006), Bucella, et al. (2011), Fonseca, et al. (2002), 
Hoehndorf, et al. (2015), Kontopoulos, et al. (2016). 
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One central strategy to achieve this effect is to ensure that ontologies incorporate 
both logical and natural language definitions of their terms. Unfortunately, the 
community of practice around ontology has, as yet, failed to develop a generally accepted 
theory of how definitions are to be authored and used in ontologies. Ontologists have also 
failed to develop a theory of the functions that definitions play. The result is that 
definition-authoring practices vary widely from one community to the next.  
While textual definitions differ from logical definitions in a number of respects; 
they also share a number of characteristics. Our goal is to contribute to furthering the 
understanding of definitions in ontologies by (1) examining what characterizes the types 
of things called ‘definition’, (2) explaining the cognitive and linguistic functions of 
definitions, and (3) providing insight into the similarities and differences between textual 
and logical definitions in ontologies. Our analysis draws on the more detailed analysis of 
terminological definitions provided in Seppälä (2012, 2015) and takes into account the 
specific contexts in which ontologies are used. 
2. A characterization of definitions 
The term ‘definition’ can be used in a number of different ways, according to the 
different types of entities to which it refers. These include:  
– a cognitive activity (the process of forming a certain cognitive representation);  
– a cognitive representation (something in a person’s mind, analogous to a belief);  
– a representational artifact (something shared that is deliberately created to do a 
certain job); 
– an act of communication. 
According to Robinson (1950: 13), the original use of the term ‘definition’ is to 
refer to a certain cognitive activity and application of the term to the other types of entities 
follows from this. The cognitive activity of defining consists in forming a mental 
representation that can serve as defining content about the definition’s object, usually 
preliminary to communicating this defining content to someone else. Such defining 
activity generally leads to a communicative act whose form and modality of expression 
will vary according to the communication situation.  
The four entities in our characterization may be defined as follows:5  
DEF1: definition as a cognitive activity  
A cognitive activity performed by a cognitive subject that consists in forming a cognitive 
representation of some entity X and serves to specify what it is that makes an entity X 
rather than something else. 
DEF2: definition as a cognitive representation (Smith, et al. 2006: 59, Smith and 
Ceusters 2015)  
                                                      
5 We extend the work presented in Smith, et al. (2006). 
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A cognitive representation composed of a set of items of knowledge or beliefs about a 
definition’s object resulting from a defining activity in the sense of DEF1. 
DEF3: definition as a representational artifact (Smith, et al. 2006: 59)  
A representational artifact that expresses the defining content (DEF2) resulting from the 
defining activity (DEF1) and is communicated in a defining act (DEF4). 
DEF4: definition as an act of communication  
A communication act that consists of communicating definition content (DEF2) by means 
of a representational artifact (DEF3) to a receiver.  
As it appears from these definitions, not only are the corresponding entities closely 
related to one another, they also presuppose the existence of other entities: participants 
(cognitive subjects), a communication situation (in presentia or in absentia), a modality 
of expression, and an object of definition (represented by the variable ‘X’). In the 
following, we examine each definition in more detail. 
2.1. DEF1: defining as a cognitive activity 
In the sense of DEF1, defining is a cognitive process. It is an activity, performed 
by a definer, that is part of the more general activity of creation of knowledge-rich 
resources. Resource creation includes gathering specialized texts and information from 
experts to compile domain-specific corpora. Such corpora are then used for identifying 
definitional contexts — portions of the corpora that articulate items of knowledge or 
belief. Based on these contexts, the cognitive activity of defining starts.  
From the identified definitional contexts, the definer selects relevant definitional 
content according to the target audience and the intended use of the definition — in this 
case, for construction of an ontology and its subsequent use by ontologists and domain 
experts. The intended use of the resource determines the extent to which the definition is 
to be descriptive or stipulative, as well as the logical form of the definition, as we will see 
in Section 3.2. With the selected definitional content, the definer constructs a definition 
(DEF2). 
The resulting definition content is checked, for example, to ensure that there are no 
counter-examples and that it deals properly with problematic cases. Finally, the definer 
chooses one or more types of representational artifacts — linguistic, symbolic, depictive, 
etc. — that are adequate for rendering the definition content (DEF2) in the intended 
context of use. The resulting output is a definition in the sense of DEF3. 
The defining activity presupposes the existence of one or more participants with 
specific roles. It involves at least one direct participant, a definer, who constructs a 
definition (DEF2) and a (real or imagined) target audience the definer has in mind. Both 
the definer and the target audience are persons who, as members of a particular 
community, have a specific role in that community. The definer can be a scientist, 
ontologist, terminologist, teacher, legislator, and so on; the target audience can, for 
example, consist of data curators, translators, learners, peers, and, as we will see, 
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computer systems. A third group of participants are the speakers (or users of language 
more broadly conceived), whose lexical use is captured in and communicated through a 
definition (Robinson 1950: 35-36). However, it seems odd to consider the latter group of 
individuals as participants in the defining activity; they are rather the source of the 
meanings expressed by the definitions. 
In general, the agent of the defining activity can be considered either as an 
immediate definer or as a mediator (Chaurand and Mazière 1990: 272). The former 
corresponds to the agent who defines ‘freely’ or ‘naturally’ (Martin 1990, Rebeyrolle 
2000) on the basis of her own knowledge and beliefs. The mediated definer is an agent 
who performs the defining activity either on the basis of direct consultation with or by 
using sources produced by the immediate definer. The immediate definer lays the basis 
from which the mediated definer can engage in the secondary activity of defining.  
In the case of ontologies, the definer is generally an ontologist or a domain expert 
working in collaboration with an ontologist. Ontologists often perform the defining 
activity as mediators, applying a more or less established methodology that requires using 
primary sources, sometimes including other ontologies. 
One thing that distinguishes ontologies from terminological dictionaries is that they 
are used not only by human beings but also by machines. Ontologies include textual as 
well as logical definitions, where, as in the words of Stevens, et al. (2011: 2), “textual 
definitions are human-facing, logical definitions are primarily machine-facing.” For 
example, microbicide in the Infectious Disease Ontology (IDO) is defined as follows: 
A material entity with an antimicrobial disposition that is realized in a process of 
killing microorganisms. 
SubClassOf  
'material entity' and 
(has_disposition some  
('antimicrobial disposition' and 
(realized_by only (results_in some death)))) 
This has consequences for both the defining activity and its product. In the case of 
textual definitions, the contents and linguistic expression can be adapted to the target 
audience of the ontology by taking into account distinct receiver-profile types (for 
example, providing the relevant information for a given level of expertise and adapting 
the defining vocabulary accordingly). In the case of logical definitions, the cognitive 
representation (DEF2) has to be rendered to be read and interpreted by a machine to 
produce logical inferences. 
2.2. DEF2: definition as a cognitive representation 
The cognitive representation that is the output of the defining activity (DEF1) is 
also called a definition (DEF2). In this sense, ‘definition’ refers to the content that can be 
copied and concretized in various ways (see DEF3). 
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The cognitive representation is composed of features, i.e., pieces of 
knowledge/beliefs. Features represent properties of the object of the definition, that is, of 
things of a certain type or of a particular thing in the world, which is the focus of the 
activities and practices of domain experts and to which they refer with one or more 
specific term(s). 
In domain-specific ontologies and terminologies, class terms denote either (i) a type 
of entities in the world (the instances), also called a ‘universal’, or (ii) a ‘defined class’, 
which denotes a group of entities demarcated by human beings on the basis of more or 
less arbitrary selection criteria (Arp, et al. 2015: 19). Examples of such defined classes 
are: American middle-class household, person who has been baptized a Lutheran, 
building located in the city of Buffalo, NY. The definition associated with either term 
describes features of the instances of the type or of members of the class.  
Associated with a term is an ‘intended meaning’ (i.e., its semantic value) that is 
specified by its definition. This intended meaning consists of a set of two or more features 
(expressing items of knowledge or beliefs) that together represent some ‘portion of 
reality’ to which the defined term refers or is meant to refer (Ceusters and Smith 2015, 
Ceusters and Smith 2010, Smith, et al. 2006). These features form the contents of a 
definition in sense DEF2. For some communities, they may amount to nothing more than 
a description of what the defined term refers to; but to work in scientific and 
computational contexts, the relevant contents must amount to a statement of necessary 
and, whenever possible, sufficient conditions (see Section 3.4.). 
Typically, a definition has the canonical form ‘X is a Y that Zs’, with the three-part 
structure: 
1. a definiendum [‘X’], i.e., the defined term; 
2. a definiens [‘a Y that Zs’], i.e., the part that expresses the definition content and 
that is called a ‘definition’ in ontologies and dictionaries; 
3. a copula [‘is a’] that expresses an equivalence between definiendum and definiens. 
In ontologies and dictionaries, definiendum and definiens appear in distinct ontology 
annotation properties and dictionary entry fields; the copula is usually implicit.6  
In its concretized form (DEF3), the definiens consists, ideally, of a short sentence 
fragment provided as the object of a ‘definition’ field in a dictionary entry or annotation 
property value in an ontology. This kind of natural language definition is also found in 
specialized terminological dictionaries. 
A good definition delimits the intended meaning of an ontology term by describing 
the instances of the type to which the term refers. It states that the Xs are of the type Y 
                                                      
6 Some ontologists use full form definitions that include the definiendum and the copula. Here, we are only 
concerned with the definiens. 
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and are distinguished from other instances of this type by some collection Z of one or 
more characteristic marks. For example, the Cell Type Ontology (CL) contains the 
following definition for the term leukocyte: 
(1) An achromatic cell of the myeloid or lymphoid lineages capable of ameboid 
movement, found in blood or other tissue. 
This example shows that the term ‘leukocyte’ [X] refers to those things that are of the 
type achromatic cell [Y] and that are distinguished from other achromatic cells in virtue 
of being: of the myeloid or lymphoid lineages [Z1]; capable of ameboid movement [Z2]; 
and found in blood or other tissue [Z3]. 
Here, the X part is classically called the species; the Y part (or ‘head’ of the 
definition), the genus and genus proximus when it is the immediate superordinate type; 
and the Z parts, the differentiae.  
In the classical Aristotelian form, an ‘is_a’ or subtype relation between the species 
and genus is asserted or implied, as in example (1) above, which we read as: a leukocyte 
is_a achromatic cell.  
A differentia may express any kind of relation relevant for describing and 
distinguishing the kinds of things to which the defined term refers (Smith, et al. 2005). In 
example (1) above, the relations expressed in the definition of leukocyte are respectively 
‘develops_from’ (the myeloid or lymphoid lineages), ‘capable_of’ (ameboid movement), 
and ‘located_in’ (blood or other tissue). Together, the genus and differentia(e) parts of a 
definition thus constitute its internal semantic structure. 
The logical form of a definition derives from the relationship between its intension 
(that which is said about the referent, i.e., a description of properties of the instances of 
the defined type) and its extension (the set of instances that fall under the intension). 
When definitions are viewed in these terms, we can distinguish four main logical forms: 
– Classical definition: A definition where the intension holds for all instances of the type 
X that is defined and does not hold for any instance that is not of that type. In this case, 
the characteristics expressed by Y and Z are both individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient for something’s being an X. This type of definition, which forms the ideal 
recommended case, is also called a definition by necessary and sufficient conditions. A 
standard example of classical definition is that of a triangle as: A rectilinear figure that 
has three sides. (All triangles and only triangles are rectilinear and have three sides. 
Everyfigure that is rectilinear and has three sides is a triangle.)  
A classical definition of the species-genus form (‘A is a B that Cs’) is also called an 
‘Aristotelian definition’, illustrated already in A man is a rational animal. Here man is 
the species, animal is the genus (or parent type) and rational is the specific difference — 
it is that feature of an instance of the genus which makes it also an instance of the species. 
Here too, the definition may have multiple differentiae. 
  7/32
– Partial definition:7 A definition where the intension holds for all instances of the type 
that is defined but also holds for instances that are not of that type. A partial definition is 
a statement of necessary conditions that are not jointly sufficient. An example of partial 
definition is that of a bird as: An animal that lays eggs. (All birds lay eggs, but other 
animals also lay eggs.)  
– Typical or prototypical definition: A definition where the intension holds for most of 
the instances of the type that is defined, especially the typical ones, but also for instances 
that are not of that type. An example of a prototypical definition is that of a swan as: An 
aquatic bird with a long neck, usually having white plumage, which holds for most swans 
and also for most snow geese.  
– Instance definition or definite description (Russell 1905): A definition where the 
intension holds for only a single instance. This kind of definition would apply, for 
example, to resources that include what may be considered as proper names, such as the 
Large Hadron Collider (LHC) in a dictionary or ontology of nuclear physics. In this case, 
the relevant kind of differentiae would probably inform us about the geographical location 
of the LHC and specify that it is (or was until some point in time) “the world’s largest 
and most powerful particle accelerator.”8  
Ideally, ontologies contain only classical definitions because their linguistic 
function is to disambiguate terms (see Section 4.2.). This is not to say that the other logical 
forms cannot appear, for instance in their textual definitions, but this is not ideal with 
respect to the function they are meant to fulfill in this context; without necessary and 
sufficient conditions, it becomes possible to interpret terms in a manner that does not 
conform to their intended use. 
2.3. DEF3: definition as a representational artifact 
The definition content (DEF2) is ultimately concretized or rendered as one or more 
representational artifacts (DEF3), which means it is given a tangible form that allows it 
to be communicated. The definition contents and its concretizations are then two sides of 
the same coin: they share the same structure and logical form — they can thus be analyzed 
in the same way, as we will see in Section 5.  
2.3.1. Concretization forms 
The concretization form of the definition content depends on the context of use and 
the relevant (material) support on which the definition is to be communicated in that 
context — paper, electronic. The concretized representational artifact can be linguistic or 
nonlinguistic.  
Generally, when we use the term ‘definition’ in the sense of a representational 
artifact, we refer to a linguistic expression in some natural language. In this case, the 
                                                      
7 See, for example, http://logic.stanford.edu/kif/definitions.html. 
8 Source: CERN, http://home.cern/topics/large-hadron-collider. 
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genus is generally expressed by means of a noun or verb, and the differentiae often by 
means of adjectives, relative clauses, and past or present participles. The form may vary 
according to specific languages, definition writing conventions, the editorial line of the 
resource, and target audiences.9 It may also be automatically checked (Seppälä 2006). 
The defining content can also be concretized by other means, for example, in a 
graphical representation of the corresponding ontology branch formed by labeled arcs 
and nodes representing classes and the relations between them. Other examples of 
concretizations that go beyond natural language are logical formalisms, chemical 
symbols, and graphs. 
In ontologies, definition contents are concretized in both linguistic and 
nonlinguistic forms for display on a computer screen and use by an automated reasoner: 
textual definitions are intended to be interpretable by human users, while logical 
definitions in the form of axioms are created, in part, so as to be able to be read and 
reasoned with by machines.  
The axioms and graph in Figure 1 concretize the same definition content as the 
textual definition of leukocyte in example (1) above: An achromatic cell of the myeloid 
or lymphoid lineages capable of ameboid movement, found in blood or other tissue. These 
are all distinct forms of concretizations that allow for the communication of the same 
contents of a definition.  
leukocyte  
SubClassOf  
achromatic cell 
 develops_from some hematopoietic stem cell 
 capable_of some ameboidal-type cell migration 
 part_of some immune system 
 
 
Figure 1: Alternative concretizations (axioms and graph)  
of the definition (DEF2) of leukocyte 
                                                      
9 Terminological manuals and guidelines state a number of general principles and recommendations relating 
to definition writing (ISO 704 2009, Pavel 2012, Pavel and Nolet 2001, Vézina, et al. 2009). For ontology-
specific recommendations, see Arp, et al. (2015), Schober, et al. (2009), Seppälä, et al. (2014), Smith 
(2013). 
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 2.3.2. Surface forms of a concretization type 
Each type of concretization takes a surface form that depends on the target audience 
(including machines) and context of use.  
The specific surface form of the linguistic (textual) concretization of the definition 
content results from lexico-syntactic choices taken to meet human user needs. These 
needs can be linguistic, cognitive, and practical, depending on users’ level of expertise, 
age, background, and the task being performed. Thus, the same defining content, for 
instance ‘four legged’, can be expressed as ‘quadruped’ when defining for specialists, and 
as ‘that has four legs’ when defining for laypersons. 
Non-linguistic concretizations use symbols that also result from formalism choices 
adapted to the target audience and context of use (machine-readable logical formalisms 
and their different syntactic forms, first order logic, chemical symbols, etc.). The choice 
of formalism depends, for instance, on the formalism’s syntactic and semantic properties, 
its expressivity, and the extent to which the formalism is known to the target audience. 
A widely used formal language for representing ontologies is the Web Ontology 
Language (OWL). In OWL, ‘class expressions’ function in a manner analogous to the 
necessary conditions previously discussed in relation to logical forms of definitions 
(Section 2.2).10 OWL ontologies can have equivalence axioms which indicate that one or 
more class expressoins are necessary and sufficient, as well as subclass axioms which 
indicate that a class expression represents a necessary condition. Together, OWL axioms 
serve to restrict the intended meaning of a term in an ontology by imposing conditions 
that must be satisfied in all models. In many of the ontologies where OWL has been used, 
it has proved difficult or impractical to provide statements of sufficient conditions; the 
axioms consist primarily of subclass axioms, i.e., they are partial definitions. 
Whether in textual or logical form, definitions in ontologies are part of an ontology 
element, analogous to definitions in a dictionary where they are part of a dictionary entry. 
Other elements of an ontology likewise correspond to lexically relevant information11, 
for example: 
– term (label, preferred label/name/term, synonym, etc.) 
– unique identifier (IRI), 
– indication of domain or scope, 
– note or comment, 
– example, 
– illustration (graphic images, photographs).  
Figure 2 shows an example of information types associated with the leukocyte 
element (class) in the Cell Ontology. 
                                                      
10 See ‘9.1 Class Expressions’, https://www.w3.org/TR/owl2-syntax/#Class_Expression. 
11 As they can be visualized, for example, in the BioPortal tool, http://bioportal.bioontology.org. We only 
include lexically relevant information types. 
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Figure 2: Display illustrating the information types for leukocyte  
in the Cell Ontology (CL)12 
In OWL, these are rendered as ‘annotation axioms’.13 These different types of 
information entity complement each other to provide users with a specification of the 
defined term and its referent. We will come back to this in Section 3, as this 
complementarity principle is important to understand the cognitive function of 
definitions. 
2.4. DEF4: defining as an act of communication 
Finally, ‘defining’ refers to a communication act with sender and receiver 
participating, which consists in the sender communicating to a receiver the definition 
contents (DEF2) by means of a representational artifact (DEF3). This process can be 
subdivided into different parts, including concretization on a communicable medium, 
realization by an oral speech act, and interpretation by an audience. 
                                                      
12 Source: BioPortal,  
https://bioportal.bioontology.org/ontologies/CL/?p=classes&conceptid=http%3A%2F%2Fpurl.obolibrary
.org%2Fobo%2FCL_0000738. 
13 See ‘10.2 Annotation Axioms’, http://www.w3.org/TR/owl2-syntax/#Annotation_Axioms. 
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Two major types of communication situation correspond to two subtypes of 
defining act and involve specific modalities, namely: 
DEF4a: defining act in presentia  
A defining act in which both sender and receiver are present and are communicating 
orally,14 for instance when an ontologist communicates with a subject-matter expert or a 
teacher with her students; 
DEF4b: defining act in absentia  
A defining act in which only the receiver is present, which consists in the receiver’s 
consulting a definition produced earlier. These acts are, for example, situations in which 
didactic, scientific, and legal texts, or terminological, lexicographic, and encyclopedic 
dictionaries are consulted. 
The defining act performed when an ontology or dictionary is consulted takes place 
in an in absentia communication situation: the sending of the definition content is 
spatiotemporally remote from its reception. 
We will not further address these aspects here, as the main focus of our analysis of 
definitions in ontologies is on their content and form (DEF2 and DEF3), and on their 
functions. 
3. Functions of definitions 
We distinguish two main functions of definitions: cognitive and linguistic. These 
functions motivate the adaptation of the definition contents and form so as to be relevant 
for different target audiences and contexts of use. 
3.1. Cognitive function of definitions 
Definitions have primarily a cognitive function. That is, they produce some effect 
in the cognitive systems of their receivers. This function consists in reconfiguring and 
sometimes augmenting the receiver’s beliefs in such a way as to fill the gap in knowledge 
that is implied by her definition consulting act (see also Sager 1990: 102). Indeed, 
definitions provide knowledge and beliefs about the objects, processes, and so forth that 
are essential to the everyday activities and practices of domain experts as reflected in their 
specialized vocabularies.  
Definitions are consulted because it is presumed that the author of the definition 
has some knowledge about the term’s meaning and properties of the term’s referent that 
                                                      
14 Note that we exclude ostension or demonstration from the extension of the defining act in the sense of 
DEF4. This modality consists in designating a particular object or a particular situation, for example, by 
pointing to it. This kind of communication act is sometimes called ‘ostensive definition’ or ‘demonstrative 
definition’ (Sager 1990, Weinreich 1970). However, these acts are limited to perception and the cognitive 
function of definitions involves more than this (see Section 3.1). 
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the receiver lacks (Sager 1990: 101-102, 112).15 Any such definition consulting act 
should therefore involve some modification in the body of knowledge and beliefs of the 
receiver, including the sort of modification that consists in adding greater confidence to 
the receiver’s beliefs. 
To see why this is so, let us go back to the complementarity principle introduced in 
Section 2.3.2. If the receiver consults an ontology or a dictionary to look up a definition, 
then she presumably already possesses complementary information type(s), such as a 
term or some perceptual knowledge of its referent, as shown in Figure 3. Therefore, the 
receiver’s need lies at the semantic level of knowledge and beliefs. 
Figure 3: Complementarity of information types corresponding to three states of 
knowledge: of term, of definition, of referent (or of an image of the referent) 
The need on the part of the receiver for the definitional content can be either real or 
only pretended, as for example when a teacher pretends not to know the meanings of 
words when asking questions of her students. In the communication situations associated 
with standard uses of ontologies and dictionaries this need is presupposed. The definer is 
not directly acquainted with the receivers; but she can nonetheless be assured that the 
typical users of the artifacts she produces are in need of cognitive reconfiguration or 
augmentation of just this sort through the enhancement of her lexical competences.  
3.1.1. Theory of lexical competence 
To put the above in terms of lexical competence, consulting an ontology or 
dictionary resource implies either (i) that the receiver’s lexical competence is lacking 
(perhaps because it is marked by uncertainty and thus in need of confirmation), or (ii) that 
the receiver’s lexical competence is to be modified to fit a specific context of use. 
                                                      
15 That is, some knowledge about the intended meaning of a term by a group of competent speakers to refer 
to something that is the object of the definition. 
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Marconi (1997: 2) divides lexical competence into two independent and cognitively 
motivated competences, one inferential (IC) and one referential (RC), further subdivided 
into naming and application abilities (NRC and ARC). These correspond, respectively, 
to a speaker’s ability to: 
IC: “have access to a network of connections between [a] word and other words and 
linguistic expressions”, and thus perform different types of inferences; 
NRC: name objects and circumstances in the world; that is, select “the right word in 
response to a given object or circumstance” (naming); 
ARC: apply a word to objects and circumstances in the world; that is, select “the right 
object or circumstance in response to a given word” (application). 
These competences rely on two distinct systems:16 the former (IC) on a semantic 
system; the latter (RC) on the perceptual and motor system. Neuropsychological studies 
show that each of these abilities can be lost or seriously damaged while the other remains 
somewhat intact (Riddoch and Humphreys 1987b). Both systems nevertheless interact 
and inferential competence plays a role in many referential performances, just as 
referential competences can enrich inferential competences. 
In this light we propose that ontology elements and dictionary entries adjust 
receivers’ lexical competence to converge towards that of competent speakers of a given 
domain (e.g., microbiology) in a given context of use (e.g., data annotation with an 
ontology of microbiology). 
Ontologies and dictionaries always have this cognitive function of lexical 
competence adjustment. Most if not all of the contents of the different fields of a 
dictionary entry contribute to the realization of this function, and something similar is 
true also in the case of ontologies (Figure 5 in Section 3.1.2).  
To understand the specific cognitive function of definitions, we go back to 
Marconi’s theory of lexical competence in (1997: 70-73), which puts forward the further 
hypothesis that “inferential competence may include several conceptually distinct and 
mentally separate abilities.” He mentions, for instance, two specific sub-competences 
involving access to the output lexicon and the semantic lexicon. 
– Output lexicon: “the words themselves (in either their phonological or graphic format)”. 
– Semantic lexicon: concepts or semantic representations “accessible from both words 
and pictures” and providing access to corresponding entities in the world.  
We call the former ‘output inferential competence’ and the latter, ‘semantic 
inferential competence’.17 We define the output inferential competence as the ability, not 
                                                      
16 See Marconi (1997: 61-64, 141-142). 
17 Not to be confused with the semantic competence that is part of our general linguistic competence 
(Marconi 1997: 77) 
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only to access the semantic lexicon, but also to make connections between word forms 
and sounds independently of their semantics. For example, to play word games where 
you go from ‘ligament’ to ‘lineament’ and ‘liniment’ (which have no connected 
meanings). We define the semantic inferential competence as the ability, not only to 
access the output lexicon and the world, but also to make inferences and connections 
between meanings, descriptions, definitions (independently of lexicalizations or of the 
world). For example, if someone tells you that they tore a ligament and you know the 
definition of that term, you might infer that the affected anatomic parts that should be 
held together are not anymore and as a result there would be considerable pain. This 
subdivision is supported by cases of individuals capable of describing the properties and 
functions of an object without being able to name it (Warrington 1985: 341-342; Riddoch 
and Humphreys: 1987a, 132; Shallice 1988: 292 ff.) McCarthy and Warrington 1988: 
429). While Marconi does not pursue this distinction further, he nevertheless notes that 
“the ability to define words (word to definition) may be dissociated from the ability to 
find the word corresponding to a given verbal definition or to a description of the word’s 
referent (definition to word).” (op. cit.)  
The distinction is relevant for understanding what kind of cognitive mechanism or 
process lies behind the act of defining: defining (DEF4) is an act that goes directly or 
indirectly from the word to the definition. We schematize these distinctions in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: Lexical competence and its sub-competences (based on Marconi 1995, 1997) 
Following these subdivisions, we propose that a definition adjusts the overall 
lexical competence of its receivers by adjusting their inferential competence, and, more 
specifically, their semantic inferential competence. The effect on referential competence 
is realized indirectly, for example, through those words in the definition in relation to 
which the receiver already enjoys referential competence. 
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3.1.2. Complementary information types for complementary adjustments 
Based on Marconi’s intuition “that the two sides of lexical competence, inferential 
and referential, mostly rely upon different kinds of information” (1995: 149) and 
considering the above subdivision of inferential competence, each information type in a 
dictionary entry and ontology element can be paired to a sub-type of competence. 
To see this, we associate the three types of lexical sub-competences introduced 
above,18 namely: 
– referential competence, 
– semantic inferential competence, 
– output inferential competence, 
with the complementary lexically relevant information types in an ontology element 
presented in Section 2.3.2 These pairings are illustrated in Figure 5. 
Figure 5: Pairings of information types in a dictionary entry and ontology element  
with the sub-competences in which they are involved 
– Referential competence: Ontologies can include examples among their elements; and 
also, though more rarely, illustrations (for example, photographic images). Both allow 
users to recognize a described portion of reality on the basis of exposure to information 
types related to referential competence. In the case of examples, the example text 
involved will standardly call in aid only the user’s referential competence — thus it will 
not explicitly convey any information pertaining to the properties of the referent of the 
                                                      
18 This parallel between different types of competences and different types of dictionaries is addressed 
several times by Marconi (1997: 56, 66-67, 114, 146, 157). In Seppälä (2012), we extended it to dictionary 
entry fields. Here we apply the proposed pairings to ontologies. 
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sort that would be provided by a definition. Illustrations can be provided by either the 
ontology developers in the form of links to images accessible through the ontology 
interface,19 or by the ontology’s users, through the annotation of images with ontology 
classes – for example, when images of plant formations are annotated with terms from 
the Plant Ontology (PO) (Lingutla, et al. 2014).  
– Semantic inferential competence: Those information types in an ontology that relate to 
semantic inferential competences are the textual definitions and axioms, the notes (in 
‘comment’ annotation properties), and indications of the domain or scope of the ontology. 
These parts of an ontology element provide information that contributes to a user’s 
understanding of the intended meaning of the ontology classes and their use in inferential, 
i.e., logical, operations. They convey the body of knowledge and beliefs that can 
reasonably be considered to be shared by both ontologists and domain experts when they 
use a given term.  
– Output inferential competence: The information types that relate to this competence are 
the label (a word or a phrase), including not only preferred label and synonyms but also 
the IRIs identifying classes or relations. IRIs are included under this heading insofar as 
ontologies are manipulated by machines and the IRIs are the symbolic forms that a 
machine uses. 
Thus, if we consider that each lexically relevant information type in an ontology element 
and dictionary entry is involved in one of the three lexical sub-competences (referential, 
output inferential, semantic inferential), then we can say that definitions have primarily 
the function of adjusting receiver’s semantic inferential competence, which is concerned 
with beliefs and reasoning. 
The cognitive function of definitions, in sum, is to bring about a belief 
reconfiguration or belief augmentation on the part of the receiver such that it allows her 
to competently use the defined term in inferential processes and, indirectly, also in 
referential ones. For this adjustment to be successful, the definition has to be relevant 
with respect to a specific target audience and context of use. We address definition 
relevance in the context of ontologies in the next section in relation to the linguistic 
function of definitions. 
3.2. Linguistic function of definitions 
In most cases, consulting an ontology or dictionary reflects, among other things, a 
need to align oneself with a certain pre-existing lexical use. Even though consulting such 
resources does not necessarily answer a lexical question as such, the fact that both 
ontologies and dictionaries include lexical units implies, at least indirectly, that they fulfill 
a linguistic function.  
                                                      
19 See the Foundational Model of Anatomy (FMA) ontology browser at   
http://xiphoid.biostr.washington.edu/fma/index.html. 
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Someone consulting an ontology or dictionary, and thus a definition, aims to attune 
their lexical competence in order to promote their use of given linguistic signs in a way 
that converges towards that of competent speakers.20 In ontologies and terminological 
dictionaries, these competent speakers are either (i) domain experts, where the resource 
in question covers domain-specific terms, or (ii) ontology or terminology experts, for 
matters pertaining to domain-independent ontology or terminology terms.  
A single lexical unit (graphic or phonic sign) can have different semantic values 
depending on the context of use, for example, on the domain of expertise (e.g., banking, 
nephrology) and the task at hand (e.g., understanding a text, annotating scientific data). 
Semantic value is thus determined in part by the context of use of given competent 
speakers. Definitions adjust receivers’ lexical competence toward the corresponding 
global norm of use, that is, a semantic value acknowledged by a given speaker 
community.  
Yet definitions are also often used stipulatively (Ajdukiewicz 1974, Gupta 2015), 
to describe or prescribe a use that is not the global norm. The effect of the definer creating 
the definition is to establish local convergences (between themself and successive 
readers) to avoid confusion with and ambiguities within the global convergent norm of 
use. 
Both global and local uses can appear in free discourse and text that constitute the 
basis for the defining activity encapsulated in ontologies and dictionaries. Ontologists and 
dictionary authors are, after all, mediators — they usually do not create norms of use but 
rather mediate between, for instance, authors of scientific textbooks and the users of 
terminologies who require support from definitions. Their secondary defining activity 
consists in making explicit the meanings underlying uses of terms of distinct provenance: 
either a global norm of use or a local use.  
Once a definition is included in an ontology or dictionary, it thenceforth expresses 
a lexical use, which can be more or less stipulative (prescriptive) depending on the context 
of use of the ontology or dictionary, the intention of the definer, the attitude of the 
receiver, and so on. A definition can thus be regarded as being on a scale that ranges from 
describing a use (descriptive definition) to having a regulatory or normative function on 
use (stipulative or prescriptive definition).  
Although an empirical question, it is reasonable to assume that the more a definition 
is descriptive and aimed at conveying the meaning of a term, for example, for 
understanding a text, the more it is likely that it will have a (proto)typical logical form, 
with a combination of necessary and (proto)typical features. On the contrary, the more a 
definition aims at stipulating a meaning, the more it tends to include only necessary (and 
possibly sufficient) conditions, which allow users to disambiguate the defined term. 
                                                      
20 Throughout this section, we use Marconi’s theory of Lexical Competence (Marconi 1997). For a similar 
pragmatic approach to competence adjustment and to its directionality (influenced by John Searle), see 
(Riegel 1990: 100-101). 
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 The relationships between types of resources, their lexical uses, and the logical 
forms, utility, and cognitive effect of their definitions is illustrated in Table 1.  
 
 
 
Type of resource 
 
Lexicographic, 
lexico-semantic, 
terminological 
Ontologies, 
standards, 
normative 
terminologies 
Lexical use describe prescribe 
Logical form of 
definitions (proto)typical 
necessary & 
sufficient 
conditions 
Utility conveying meaning 
disambiguating 
meaning 
Cognitive effect knowledge/belief augmenting 
knowledge/belief 
reconfiguring 
Table 1: Relationships between types of resources, their lexical uses, and the 
logical forms, utility, and cognitive effect of their definitions 
The table shows the spectrum of properties of more lexically-oriented resources in 
the middle column and ontologically-oriented resources on the right. The former tend to 
have more descriptive and proto-typical definitions, employed mostly to convey meaning. 
The latter tend to include more prescriptive definitions with necessary and, possibly, 
sufficient conditions, employed mostly to disambiguate meanings. The corresponding 
cognitive effects tend to be, respectively, more belief-augmentating and belief-
reconfiguring. Note that whenever a definition fulfills a linguistic function a cognitive 
function is also fulfilled — but that the reverse does not hold. 
In sum, the linguistic function of a definition is to convey or disambiguate the 
semantic value of a term in a more or less descriptive or stipulative way, by delimiting its 
intension and extension by means of more or less proto)typical and classical definitions. 
The resulting cognitive effects on the body of knowledge and beliefs of the receiver are 
more or less to augment and reconfigure them.  
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4. Functions of definitions in ontologies 
4.1. Stipulation of the intended meaning of a term 
In ontologies, the represented knowledge is not always related to a lexical unit that 
is naturally used by speakers. The represented classes are usually labeled with terms from 
a controlled vocabulary with an intended meaning, where terms from the vocabulary may 
or may not be used in natural-language contexts. Whether an ontology term is commonly 
used by domain experts, its definition specifies the intended meaning of the ontology 
terms in a normative way. Definitions in ontologies allow ontology users to use these 
terms in a competent manner; ontologies enhance users’ lexical competence with respect 
to ontology terms by providing definitions that clarify and disambiguate.  
The corresponding adjustment of semantic inferential competences is, therefore, 
mostly a belief-reconfiguring one — as opposed to a belief-augmenting adjustment. 
When consulting a definition in an ontology, the receiver (usually a domain expert) has 
to set aside the body of knowledge accumulated over the years about the terms of her 
domain and their referents, and restrict the meaning of the term to only those items of 
knowledge intended by the ontology developers. This involves some reconfiguration in 
her beliefs. 
4.2. Term disambiguation 
Ontologies and controlled vocabularies aim at aligning the lexical use of their users 
to achieve intra- and inter-personal consistency, for example, when annotating scientific 
data or integrating databases with an ontology. Correspondingly, definitions fulfill a 
stipulative linguistic function; that of adjusting the receiver’s lexical competence towards 
a local use. In order for a definition to realize this function, it has to be tailored in such a 
way that its logical form leaves no room for ambiguity. It therefore has a disambiguating 
function.  
To realize this function, ontologies would ideally provide Aristotelian definitions 
in which the genus (more precisely, the immediate superordinate category or genus 
proximus) is specified along with the differentiae to provide a statement of individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions that precisely distinguishes the intended 
meaning of the term from that of neighboring terms. Provision of such Aristotelian 
definitions is costly, however, and in some cases it is not possible at all because of lack 
of scientific knowledge; thus ontologies (especially large ontologies) often make do 
merely with the statement of necessary conditions as tool for disambiguation. 
Where definitions are provided using a formal language such as OWL, they take 
the form of axioms which serve to disambiguate terms in a way that is analogous to the 
way textual definitions serve this purpose. Every subclass axiom represents a necessary 
condition that all instances in the extension of the term need to satisfy. These axioms 
serve to determine the extension of a term by restricting it to those entities meeting the 
asserted condition. Each additional axiom restricts the extension further, though it is in 
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many cases not possible to restrict the term to only its intended extension by providing 
conditions that are jointly sufficient. When a classical definition is possible, an 
equivalence axiom is used as shown in the axiom defining the IDO term bacteremia.  
 
bacteremia 
EquivalentTo 
infection and 
(has_part some 
  (infectious agent and Bacteria and 
   (located_in some blood))) 
For the most part, a class (as opposed to a class expression) serving as relatum in a 
subclass and equivalence axiom should correspond directly to the genus in the textual 
definition as in the case of ‘achromatic cell’ in the definition of leukocyte (Figure 1). The 
other defining conditions are expressed by non-atomic class expressions.  
 
unblinding process  
SubClassOf 
 planned process 
 (part_of some study design execution)  
and (part_of some informing subject of study arm) 
Here, two axioms define the term unblinding process in the Ontology for Biomedical 
Investigations (OBI). ‘Planned process’ is the asserted superclass of ‘unblinding process’, 
as in: ‘unblinding process is_a planned process’. ‘Part_of some study design execution’ 
and ‘part_of some informing subject of study arm’ are class expressions that in 
conjunction restrict the extension of ‘unbinding process’ to only those planned processes 
that are part of a study design execution and that inform the subjects about the study arm 
in which they participate. 
The logic of the ‘subClassOf’ relation is that the members of the defined class are 
also members of all the other classes specified in the conjoined class expressions. Thus, 
all unblinding processes are members of the class ‘planned process’, as well as of the 
classes of things that are part of a study design execution and things that inform the 
subjects about the study arm in which they participate. 
4.3. Functions of logical definitions 
In addition to the cognitive and linguistic functions described above, which apply 
both to textual and logical definitions, we distinguish three primary functions of logical 
definitions: instance classification and consistency checking, taxonomic schematization, 
and regularizing expression of facts. 
4.3.1 Instance classification and consistency checking 
Classical definitions function in instance classification and consistency checking. 
Necessary conditions serve as checklists for determining whether an instance is consistent 
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with the classes of which it is asserted to be a member. When an instance’s properties are 
consistent with sufficient conditions for a class, that instance can be asserted to be of that 
class. Indeed, the linguistic function of a definition is to convey the semantic value of a 
term by delimiting its intension and extension. Definitions in ontologies include 
statements of necessary conditions and thus allow us to define intensions of their terms 
and thereby enable ontologies to be used as reliable heuristics for such classification tasks.  
This function is further useful for identifying errors in definitions, since it allows 
the definer to test the scope of a definition by seeing whether it classifies the right 
instances and is able to exclude unwanted ones as inconsistent. The definition content 
may thus be checked and corrected to ensure that it is about the definition object and only 
the definition object. For example, if there are exemplars of the definition object that 
don’t concord with the definition then the defining content is adjusted so as to include 
those. Similarly, if there are entities that concord with the definition, but are not 
exemplars of the intended definition object, then the defining content is adjusted to 
exclude them. 
4.3.2. Taxonomic schematization 
We call the second function ‘taxonomic schematization’. When employed in this 
capacity, the logical definition of a class provides a schema or template for the axioms of 
its subclasses. The goal is to provide robust, principled taxonomic relations between 
parent, child, and sibling classes. The axioms specified for each class are true of all its 
subclasses. This makes it possible to use axioms to specify differentiae for its child 
classes, in other words, to use these axioms as templates for the axioms of the subclasses, 
as well as for the contents of the associated textual definitions (Seppälä 2012, 2015).  
This can be done by asserting a relational axiom for the parent class relating it to 
some other kind of entity (e.g., by writing an axiom for a class X asserting that any X 
part_of some Y). For every subclass of X, a subclass of Y can then be distinguished. The 
property relating both relata can also be a sub-property of the more general one. For 
example, the axiom specifying the term infection in the Infectious Disease Ontology 
(IDO): 
infection 
SubClassOf  
material entity  
(has_part some infectious agent) and 
(part_of some extended organism) 
can be used to generate the axioms of its child terms, such as bacteremia (see Figure 6). 
Here the class expression ‘infectious agent and Bacteria’ is a subclass of ‘infectious 
agent’ and so further specifies what kind of ‘infectious agent’ characterizes bacteremia.  
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Figure 6: Correspondences in the parts of the textual definition  
and the axioms of the IDO term bacteremia 
4.3.3. Regularizing expression of facts 
An ontology can be considered a specification of a controlled vocabulary for 
expressing facts in a given domain. Such a vocabulary is much sparser than the 
vocabulary that would be used to express these facts in natural language, that is, there is 
a one-many correspondence between ontology terms and words in domain-relevant 
portions of natural language. This means that the syntax for expressing facts (i.e., 
assertions between instances) using ontology terms necessarily diverges from the syntax 
used for expressing the same facts in natural language.  
An important function of axioms in ontologies is to provide a schematic indication 
of how this should be done. Thus, axioms complement textual definitions in contributing 
cognitively towards regularizing users’ use of terms. Consider, for example, the class 
expression ‘develops_from some hematopoietic stem cell’ as it occurs in one of the 
axioms involving the term ‘leukocyte’ in the Cell Type Ontology (CL) (see Sections 2.2 
and 2.3.1). In this expression, the relation ‘of the … lineages’ in natural language is 
expressed at the logical level by the ‘develops_from’ relation that is part of the controlled 
vocabulary of the ontology.  
4.4. Synthesis 
Textual and logical definitions in ontologies have overlapping and complementary 
functions. Both adjust receivers’ (humans’ and machines’) lexical competence by 
describing or stipulating a term’s intended meaning. The particular context of use of 
ontologies gives precedence to the logical definition, since it is the one used by the 
reasoner to perform logical operations. Therefore, the contents of the definition have to 
be adapted for use by machines. One such adaptation is to include necessary, and 
whenever possible sufficient, conditions.  
Yet, stating only necessary (and sufficient) conditions in a textual definition might 
be too limited for an adequate understanding of the defined term. It may be useful to add 
extra information about the defined term’s referent, such as typical features. But such 
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non-necessary conditions could, in logics such as description logics, make reasoning 
more difficult. Thus, any extra information that might be useful for human understanding 
should be included, for such logics, in the form of a comment that may be complemented 
with examples. As we saw in Sections 2.3.2 and 3.1, all these information types – 
definitions, comments, notes, examples, etc., – complement each other to enhance an 
ontology user’s overall lexical competence; the definition adjusts it to a specific context 
of use, which in ontologies requires disambiguating terms. In that sense, the textual 
definition in the ‘comment’ or ‘definition’ annotation property contains the information 
that is relevant in the context of ontologies and their uses. The rest of the information 
could also be relevant, i.e. potentially defining, for example in a terminological dictionary 
context, but not in an ontology. The complementary information must however be 
controlled to avoid introducing ambiguity. 
Furthermore, in order to ensure consistency in ontology development and use, the 
textual and logical definitions of a term must convey the same type of content. Thus, 
axioms can be used as content templates for lower-level categories and for textual 
definitions (provided the axioms are complete, see Section 5 below). The controlled 
vocabulary used in axioms allows the user to check the intended meaning of a natural 
language expression in the textual definition. However, as noted by Stevens, et al. (2011: 
6), textual definitions are not simple sentence-by-sentence verbalizations of axioms. The 
axioms create unordered lists of sentences or sentence fragments that can involve 
redundancies. A textual definition is rather a grouping of one or more axioms that form a 
non-redundant, fluent paragraph. To illustrate this, see the difference in the order of the 
differentiae and the corresponding axioms in the textual and logical definitions of the 
IDO term amebiasis (Figure 8 in Section 5.2 below). The expressions used in natural 
language definitions are more idiomatic. Expressions such as ‘continuant_part_of’ or 
‘inheres_in’ are after all not very natural. 
In this respect, an ontology element functions like a dictionary entry in providing 
complementary information types that participate in the adjustment of the different sub-
competences of the ontology users’ overall lexical competence. 
5. Similarities and differences between textual and logical definitions in ontologies 
The linguistic function of textual definitions in ontologies is to specify the intended 
meaning of the ontology terms in order to avoid ambiguities and errors when for example 
annotating biomedical research texts and importing terms into other ontologies. Of 
course, this is also the function performed by logical definitions, as we saw in the previous 
section. However, not all users of ontologies are willing to work with logical definitions, 
and even the creators of logical definitions may require a textual definition as starting 
point. 
Ontologies provide textual and logical definitions to enhance human users’ and 
computational systems’ lexical competence. They adjust these receivers’ semantic 
inferential competences by reconfiguring their body of knowledge associated with the use 
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of given terms. The goal of textual and logical definitions in ontologies is to align their 
use of a term with that of the rest of the community of competent speakers using the same 
ontology. Therefore, as we saw, definitions must be relevant for that purpose, that is, 
provide the relevant kind of content (DEF2) in an adequate unambiguous form (DEF3). 
Logical and textual definitions differ in form, but are of course not completely 
distinct. In the ideal case, indeed, they will be logically equivalent. At a minimum, certain 
correspondences will exist between the phrases used in textual and in the corresponding 
logical definitions (Stevens, et al. 2011: 3). These correspondences can be used to provide 
guidelines for identifying problems with definition contents as well as indications for 
quality assurance of definitions, and thus help developers improve their ontologies 
(Seppälä, et al. 2014).21 
In this last section, we compare textual and logical definitions in ontologies to 
reveal similarities and differences between both forms, and show what kinds of issues or 
inconsistencies can be identified through these comparisons. By working through 
examples of the correspondence between parts of textual and logical definitions, we show 
how to compare and contrast each, and how each perspective reveals areas for 
improvement. We identify at least four types of correspondences. 
5.1. Exact correspondence 
Figure 7 shows that the parts of the textual definition of dead-end host in IDO 
correspond exactly to the logical definition by necessary and sufficient conditions 
(indicated by the ‘EquivalentTo’ property). The only difference is in the natural language 
expression (‘bearing’) that is used for the ‘has_role’ ontological relation — perhaps to 
avoid the seemingly redundant use of ‘role’ twice in the textual definition. Here, the 
logical part is useful to clarify the intended meaning of the natural language expression. 
Figure 7: Correspondences in the parts of the textual definition  
and the axioms of the IDO term dead-end host 
                                                      
21 We can also apply the sorts of semi-automated methods being used in the terminological world (Seppälä 
2012, 2015) both in establishing such correspondences and in identifying quality issues in the textual 
definitions that might point to quality issues in their logical counterparts. 
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5.2. Structural correspondence but more specific content in textual definitions than in 
axioms 
Figure 8 shows that both differentiae in the textual definition of the IDO term 
amebiasis contain information of the type expressed in the subclass axioms inherited from 
the parent class infection (see dashed and dotted lines). However, part of the content 
conveyed by the textual definition of amebiasis is more specific than the expressions in 
the axiom: ‘colon’ and ‘organism of the Species Entamoeba histoytica’ are respectively 
subclasses of the classes ‘part_of extended organism’ and ‘infectious agent’ in the axiom. 
Figure 8: Correspondences in the parts of the textual definition  
and the axioms of the IDO term amebiasis 
If the axioms of a class are relevant for distinguishing its subclasses, then the set of 
axioms should be used as a template for the subclasses—see the taxonomic 
schematization function of logical definitions in Section 3.3.2. The set of axioms of each 
subclass then instantiates the template by replacing the same set of elements with classes 
of similar specificity. For example, if the differentiae in the class template include 
conditions on 'has part' and 'part of', all the subclasses of that class should use 
specializations of those conditions in their differentiae. Using this principle, we can check 
the adequacy of definition contents by identifying mismatches in the levels of specificity 
of subclass axioms. For example, if part of a term’s logical definition matches an 
expression inherited from a superclass, it might be a sign that the logical definition of the 
defined subclass is missing a more specific subclass axiom to distinguish it from its parent 
and neighboring classes. If this is the case, the textual definition can be used as a basis 
for creating this more specific axiom. For instance, in the amebiasis example of Figure 8, 
the class expression ‘part_of some extended organism’ in the definition of the term’s 
superordinate infection, could be specialized with the following expression: 22 
located_in some colon. 
                                                      
22 According to the definition of ‘extended organism’, anything that is located in an organism (e.g., in the 
interior of the colon) is part of the extended organism (e.g., the body) of which that organism is a part (a 
colon is part of a body). 
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This more specific expression could be added to the logical definition of amebiasis if the 
ontology provides the corresponding terms (class and object property). 
5.3. Missing axioms 
The term transmission process from IDO has the textual definition A process that 
is the means during which the pathogen is transmitted directly or indirectly from its 
natural reservoir, a susceptible host or source to a new host. However, the only logical 
axiom given is that it is a subclass of ‘process’. The textual differentiae parts have no 
correspondence in the logical axiom, for example: 
– that there are participants including pathogen and susceptible host; 
– that the process occurs in part in a natural reservoir or infected source and in part in the 
host. 
Here too, the textual parts can be used for creating the corresponding axioms. 
5.4. Redundant parts of axioms or definitions 
Logical parts may contain axioms defining other terms. Figure 9 shows that parts 
of the axioms defining antiseptic role in IDO imply two sorts of redundancies: (i) the first 
axiom (see dashed lines) includes the logical definition (‘EquivalentTo’) of the class 
‘antimicrobial’, i.e., a material entity that has an antimicrobial disposition; (ii) the second 
axiom includes the subclass axioms defining the term antimicrobial disposition (see grey 
lines). 
Figure 9: Redundant axioms in the logical definition of the IDO term antiseptic role 
These redundancies should not be a problem at the logical level, since the inferences 
that are made based on the logical expressions end up being the same computationally. 
However, at the textual level, this amounts to defining another term within the definition 
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of the defined term. This lacks conciseness and is generally considered bad practice.23 It 
unnecessarily overloads the contents of the definition — imagine if each term of a 
definition were replaced by its definition. More importantly, the reader might not 
recognize that it is the definition of another term and fail to link the defined term with 
that other one. Whenever a textual definition contains the definition of another term from 
the same ontology or an imported ontology, this sub-definition should be replaced by the 
corresponding term. If the reader does not know the term used in the definition, she can 
(in principle) look it up in the ontology.  
Going back to Figure 9, the redundancy in the second part also reveals an error in 
the logical definition. The first clause says that everything in which an antiseptic role 
inheres also has an antimicrobial disposition. The second clause gives conditions on the 
realization of the antiseptic role, which are taken again from the definition of 
‘antimicrobial disposition.’ So, as it appears in the logical definition, antiseptic role is 
stated to be a subclass of antimicrobial disposition. However, antiseptic roles are different 
from antimicrobial dispositions because antiseptics are used for a purpose (‘is applied to’) 
but they have their action because they have an antimicrobial disposition. As roles and 
dispositions are disjoint, ‘antiseptic role’ cannot be a subclass of ‘antimicrobial 
disposition’.  
The problem is that in order for the role to be differentiated from the disposition, 
the realization needs to be different from that of the disposition. The realization of the 
antiseptic role also includes the application of the material, for example, of an antiseptic 
liquid on the skin. The dotted lines in the textual definition (pointing to the Ø symbol) 
show that this information is included in the textual definition, but is missing from the 
axioms. 
The definition can be reformulated to fix these errors and, in the process, remove 
the repeated parts of the definition as follows: 
antiseptic role 
SubClassOf  
'role' and 
inheres_in some ‘antimicrobial’ 
(realized_in only 
'planned process' and  
(has_part 
((realizes some 'antiseptic disposition') and  
(occurs_in some 'extended organism')))) 
6. Conclusion 
We examined the characteristics of the four types of things to which the term 
‘definition’ refers: a cognitive activity (DEF1) that produces a cognitive representation 
                                                      
23 See, for example, ISO 704 (2009: 28). 
  28/32
(DEF2), which constitutes the content of a representational artifact (DEF3) that 
concretizes this content and that is communicated in a communication act (DEF4).  
We then focused on the cognitive and linguistic functions of definitions in general, 
and on the specific functions of textual and logical definitions in ontologies. We based 
our analysis of the cognitive and linguistic functions of definitions on a theory of lexical 
competence proposed by Marconi. Following the subdivisions of lexical competence 
suggested by Marconic and extending them with two more specific inferential 
competences, we put forward the following explanation: definitions adjust receivers’ 
overall lexical competence by adjusting their inferential competence, and, more 
specifically, their semantic inferential competence. In ontologies, definitions bring about 
a reconfiguration of the receivers’ existing body of knowledge regarding the intended 
referent of the defined term. Definitions and axioms adjust the knowledge or beliefs of 
the receiver in such a way that they become more closely aligned to the knowledge or 
beliefs of relevant experts. 
We showed that to achieve an adequate adjustment, definitions must be adapted to 
allow the receivers to use a term in a way that converges toward the use of that term by 
the community of experts for a specific task. Therefore, linguistically speaking, 
definitions function to delimit the intended meaning of ontology terms to avoid 
ambiguities and errors when applied to such tasks as annotating scientific texts with 
ontology terms and reusing existing terms in new ontologies. To do so, definitions must 
be constructed in a way that is relevant to their context of use and their target audience.  
In the context of use of ontologies, logical definitions are mainly intended for 
automatic reasoning systems; their symbolic and logical forms must be computer-
tractable. Logical definitions take the form of axioms stating necessary and, whenever 
possible sufficient, conditions to delimit the intension and extension of a class term. To 
ensure a consistent use of the ontology terms by human users, their textual definitions 
should contain the same type of content as the corresponding logical definitions. 
Nevertheless, in virtue of the complementarity principle of information types, textual 
definitions can be complemented with notes and other useful comments included in the 
other parts of an ontology element. 
In the last section, we analyzed four types of correspondences between textual and 
logical definitions to show what kinds of issues or inconsistencies can be identified by 
these comparisons. We suggested that comparing the parts of both forms of definitions 
may be useful for improving the quality of definitions in ontologies. 
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DEFINITIONS IN ONTOLOGIES 
Abstract: Ontologies standardly contain definitions, which can be of two kinds: textual, 
to help human users understand and correctly use the ontology terms; and logical, to allow 
automated systems to check the consistency of the ontology, to enhance querying, and to 
integrate and compare data annotated using the ontology. Textual and logical definitions 
have overlapping and complementary functions. Both share the functions of fixing, 
clarifying, and conveying the intended meaning of terms in the ontology. Both fulfil a 
cognitive function by enhancing the lexical competence of users when working with the 
ontology terms whose meanings are specified. 
In this communication, we examine the different kinds of things to which the term 
‘definition’ refers, and review their linguistic and cognitive functions. We focus on the 
function of definitions as a means for enhancing the semantic inferential competences of 
human users and automated systems. We also emphasize functions more specific to 
definitions in ontologies. Finally, through comparisons of textual and logical definitions, 
we show how analyzing these correspondences may be useful for improving the quality 
of definitions in ontologies.  
Keywords: ontology, definitions, textual definitions, logical definitions, functions of 
definitions, definition checking  
LES DÉFINITIONS DANS LES ONTOLOGIES 
Résumé: Les ontologies comportent des définitions qui, typiquement, y sont de deux 
sortes : textuelles et logiques. Les définitions textuelles aident l’utilisateur à comprendre 
et à utiliser correctement les termes de l’ontologie ; les définitions logiques permettent 
aux systèmes informatiques de vérifier la consistance logique des ontologies, d’enrichir 
les requêtes, et d’intégrer et comparer des données annotées à l’aide d’ontologies. Les 
définitions textuelles et logiques ont des fonctions partagées et complémentaires. Toutes 
deux partagent la fonction de fixer, clarifier et communiquer le sens voulu des termes de 
l’ontologie. Toutes deux se complètent dans leur fonction cognitive d’ajuster et, ainsi, 
améliorer les compétences lexicales des utilisateurs lorsqu’ils emploient les termes 
définis dans l’ontologie. 
Dans cet article, nous examinons les différents types de choses auxquelles le terme 
‘définition’ réfère et passons en revue les fonctions linguistiques et cognitives des 
définitions. Nous mettons l’accent sur leur fonction d’ajustement des compétences 
inférentielles sémantiques des utilisateurs et des systèmes. Nous examinons également 
les fonctions propres aux définitions dans les ontologies. À travers des comparaisons de 
définitions textuelles et logiques nous montrons, pour conclure, comment une analyse de 
leurs correspondances peut s’avérer utile pour améliorer la qualité des ontologies. 
Mots-clés: ontologies, définitions, définitions textuelles, définitions logiques, fonctions 
des définitions, contrôle-qualité de définitions 
 
